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Abstract: 
 
In this paper I argue that Rothstein and Teorell’s (2008) concept of impartiality helps 
to integrate four conspicuously disparate strands in the literature on consequences of 
government institutions: the literatures on corruption and social capital, growth and 
economic development, bureaucratic quality and civil war, and on subjective well-
being and happiness. Second, I present some original data on the impartiality of 
government institutions in 52 countries across the globe, based on a web-based expert 
poll with public administration scholars. I then perform cross-country tests of the 
predictions of the theoretical model, showing that impartial institutions affect 
institutional trust, economic growth, and individual-level happiness. Although less 
robustly so, impartiality is also related to stocks of social capital and the absence of 
civil war. With few exceptions, the relationships between impartiality and societal 
outcome variables are on par with those of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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Introduction 
A strong recent tenet within comparative political economy has stressed that what hinders 
economic development in large parts of the world are low-quality government institutions 
responsible for implementing laws and policies (Mauro 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Clague et al. 1999; Evans and Rauch 1999; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). 
The rapid growth in research on “quality of government” and “good governance” in recent 
years has however not only been concerned with growth and economic development. The 
quality of government (QoG) factor has also been argued to have substantial effects on a 
number of important non-economic phenomena, both at the individual level — such as 
subjective happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Helliwell 2003; Tavits 2007; Helliwell and 
Huang 2008), citizen support for government (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 
2006), and interpersonal trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; 
Rothstein and Eek 2009) — and at the societal level — such as improved public health and 
environmental sustainability (Holmberg et al. 2009), state legitimacy (Gilley 2006), the 
incidence of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Paris 2004; Öberg and Melander 2005) and 
even interstate belligerence (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). 
 
In a recently published article, I have argued with Bo Rothstein that the core concept of this 
emerging literature lacks a strong conceptual foundation. Simply put, what should count as 
quality of government is not properly specified and severely undertheorized. In response to 
this, we argue that what enables well-working governments to achieve these goals is their 
capacity to exert political authority impartially (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Lacking 
adequate indicators of impartiality, however, we were unable to verify this claim empirically. 
This is the aim of the present paper. 
 
I will first argue that the concept of impartiality at the theoretical level helps to integrate four 
conspicuously disparate strands in the literature on consequences of government institutions: 
the literatures on corruption and social capital, growth and economic development, 
bureaucratic quality and civil war, and on subjective well-being and happiness. Second, I 
present some original data on the impartiality of government institutions in 52 countries 
across the globe, based on a web-based expert poll with public administration scholars. I then 
perform cross-country tests of the predictions of the theoretical model, including the effects of 
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impartial institutions on levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, economic growth, the 
incidence of civil war and individual-level happiness. I conclude by way of summing up my 
findings. 
Integrating the Literature 
The argument put forward by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) in favor of impartiality as the most 
important feature of government institutions is premised on normative political philosophy. 
By analogy with political equality as the basic norm underlying the input side of the political 
system, as argued by Dahl (1989) and numerous other democratic theorists, impartiality is the 
norm on the output side that is most compatible with the normative principle of treating 
everyone with equal concern and respect. We define this impartiality norm as follows: “When 
implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration 
anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law” 
(Rothstein and Teorell 2008, 170). 
 
Normative theory aside, the heightened interest in QoG and “good governance” recently 
would not have been brought about without supportive empirical evidence that these things do 
matter for social and economic development. Apart from a normative argument in favor of 
impartiality as following from first principles, we would thus ideally prefer to also have an 
empirical argument stating that impartiality leads to “good” outcomes, such as material and 
subjective well-being. This way of supporting an argument from both the normative and 
empirical sides in a sense resembles what Rawls (1971) termed a “reflective equilibrium”. In 
political philosophy, Rawls argued, one may favor a certain notion of, say, distributive justice 
because (a) it follows most clearly from basic normative principles, or (b) it is most 
compatible with our considered judgments of what counts as fair. Sometimes there is a 
mismatch between the two, leading to a process of refining both basic principles and intuitive 
moral judgments until they coincide (in the “reflective equilibrium”). In a similar vein, a 
specific notion of what should count as quality of government ought not only be derived from 
normative principles. It also needs to be demonstrated that this notion is capable of producing 
morally preferred social outcomes. Whether the impartiality principle lives up to this latter 
standard is to be tested in this paper.  
 
Recent empirical evidence has to a large extent been mustered with respect to the 
consequences of QoG for growth and long-term economic development. A smaller but 
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growing literature relates QoG to the incidence of civil war, as well as to personal happiness 
and subjective well-being. How does the theory of impartial government institutions fare with 
these results and their corresponding notions of QoG? As I argue below, a key to 
understanding these results may be found in the theory of social capital. I therefore first 
exploit the link between impartiality and social capital, and then turn to the other specific 
effects in turn.1 
Corruption and Trust 
The importance of social capital for good governance, economic growth and individual well-
being has been widely recognized. However, the idea launched by Putnam (1993) that social 
capital is generated by people being active in “bridging” voluntary associations has not fared 
well when tested empirically. Rothstein (2005) and Rothstein and Stolle (2008) argue instead 
that universal political institutions are a better explanation for the generation of social capital. 
This is due to the following threefold causal logic. First, people make inferences from how 
they perceive public officials. If public officials are known for being partial or corrupt, 
citizens will believe that even people whom the law requires to act in the service of the public 
cannot be trusted. This should in particular be the case when officials responsible for 
enforcing the law or adjudicating court cases are considered partial, since people then infer 
that cheaters can get away with it. Secondly, people will infer that most people in a society 
with partial or corrupt officials must take part in corruption, bribery, and various forms of 
nepotism in order to obtain what they feel their rightful due. Thirdly, in order to make a living 
in such a society, citizens must, even though they may consider it morally wrong, also begin 
to take part in bribery, corruption, and nepotism. Taken together, this impels people in corrupt 
societies to conclude that most other people cannot be trusted (Rothstein 2005, 121-2). As 
should be clear, this argument hinges on a specific notion of corruption, concurring with 
Kurer (2005, 230) in stating that “corruption involves a holder of public office violating the 
impartiality principle in order to achieve private gain”. Corruption is thus conceived of as a 
way of systematically breaching the impartiality principle. 
 
This line of reasoning leads to the following empirical predictions: 
 
                                                    
1
 Readers who put particular faith in theoretical propositions articulated before the collection of data may consult 
Rothstein and Teorell (2005), wherein a first version of the following empirical predictions was published, some 
3 years before data collection began. 
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H1: Countries with impartial government institutions have higher levels of interpersonal 
trust. 
 
H2: Countries with impartial government institutions have higher levels of institutional trust, 
particularly with respect to bodies responsible for policy implementation and law 
enforcement. 
 
I may also posit a joint hypothesis linking these two expectations together: 
 
H2j: Impartial government institutions are linked to higher levels of interpersonal trust 
through their relationship with institutional trust. 
 
Although systematic empirical testing in this field is in its infancy, it deserves noting that 
several links in this proposed causal chain have gained empirical support. Anderson and 
Tverdova (2003) and Chang and Chu (2006) show that corruption lowers trust in government 
institutions. Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) document that people targeted by universal welfare 
programs, which are more likely to be perceived as fair by their recipients, are more trusting 
than people targeted by needs tested benefits. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) find that 
corruption reduces interpersonal trust (through its effect on income inequality). Knack and 
Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001), moreover, find that “formal institutions” for the 
effective enforcement of agreements and laws positively affect levels of trust. Moreover, 
recent experimental work shows that both (high trusting) Swedish and (low trusting) 
Romanian students, when confronted with scenarios where they encounter that public officials 
in an “unknown city in an unknown country” are asking for and also getting bribes, do not 
only loose trust in these public officials (policemen and doctors), but also in “other people in 
general” in that “unknown city” (Rothstein and Eek 2009). 
  
Finally, the impartiality theory casts some additional light on Anderson & Tverdova’s (2003) 
finding that support for the incumbent alleviates the effect of corruption on trust in 
government.  According to the authors this may be explained by the fact that “government 
supporters are more likely to be the beneficiaries of the goods distributed by corrupt public 
officials” (ibid., 94). This is exactly what should be expected from the impartiality 
perspective. Violation of non-discrimination norms entails partial treatment, that is, treatment 
that favors some at the expense of others. This partial treatment is however not expected to be 
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targeted haphazardly, but towards those who have contributed to bringing the incumbents to 
power. As a result, supporters of government are less negatively affected in their stance 
toward partial government institutions. 
Growth and Economic Development 
The power of the impartiality theory to explain growth is best illustrated by its ability to 
integrate four seemingly unconnected but empirically corroborated determinants of growth in 
the literature:  the security of property and contract rights (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; cf. Glaeser et 
al. 2004; Kurtz and Schrank 2007); (2) aggregate levels of interpersonal trust (Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Beugelsdijk et al. 2004); (3) corruption (Mauro 1995); 
and (4) a scale of the “Weberianness” of state bureaucracies (Evans and Rauch 1999). 
 
Let me discuss these in turn. A strong theoretical impetus for the link between growth and 
secure contract rights is provided by North (1990, 54), who asserts  that “the inability of 
societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source 
of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World”. The 
reason for this is that the kind of market essential for economic development requires 
“nonsimultaneous transactions, in which the quid is needed at one time or place and the quo at 
another” (Clague et al. 1999, 186). Paradigmatic examples of such transactions include 
borrowing and lending, a demander and supplier some distance apart, and parties to an 
insurance. “In all of these cases”, Clague et al. (1999, 186) argue, “the gains from trade 
cannot be realized unless the parties expect that the contracts they make will be carried out.” 
Of equal importance is a guarantee that the fruits of such transactions are not at some later 
time point expropriated by the state or by other economic actors. This is the simple theoretical 
case for secure property rights. 
 
Impartial government institutions enter the theory of property and contract rights through the 
problem of enforcement. This follows most clearly if we acknowledge that property and 
contract rights are not primarily of importance as paper constructs, but in the ways they enter 
people’s minds. For contract rights to work in practice, the parties to a deal must be expected 
to hold their promises. Similarly, for property rights to function people must share the same 
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set of beliefs as to where the borders separating one’s property from the others’ are located.2 
In the words of de Soto (2001, 186), “it is not your own mind that gives you certain exclusive 
rights over a specific asset, but other minds thinking about your rights in the same way you 
do. These minds vitally need each other to protect and control their assets”. This implies that 
the actual workings of both contract and property rights are based on certain behavioral 
expectations. To separate what is mine from what is yours, and to able to strike a deal, I must 
expect certain behavior in return from my fellow citizens.  
 
As critics of Hobbes have argued for centuries, however, these expectations cannot be upheld 
solely with the use of force by a third party such as the state. As North (1990, 58) himself puts 
it: “Enforcement is costly. Indeed, it is frequently costly even to find out that a contract has 
been violated, more costly to be able to measure the violation, and still more costly to be able 
to apprehend and impose penalties on the violator.” If every nonsimultaneous economic 
transaction would rely on the parties being certain that any future violation of the deal would 
be detected and punished by a third party, then very few such transactions would be 
undertaken. The transaction costs would simply be too high. But if, instead, these transactions 
could rely on an entrenched feeling that other people generally may be trusted, or a norm 
specifying that favors generally are returned, then transaction costs would be substantially 
lower. In other words, what helps some societies solve the problem of how to enforce contract 
and property rights is their access to a healthy stock of social capital.  
 
And where does this social capital come from? Well, as already argued above, primarily from 
having impartial government institutions. Such institutions help to mold the long-term 
behavioral expectations that underpin economic transactions. As Clague et al. (1996, 254) put 
it, a notable way in which government may violate the property and contract rights of their 
subjects is by “failing to provide a legal infrastructure that impartially enforces contracts and 
adjudicates disputes about property rights”. What is critical to apprehend in this theory is that, 
once in the cooperative equilibrium of contracts self-enforced by trust and norms of 
reciprocity, the state hardly needs to act as the third-party enforcer. Yet it is the fact that the 
state is expected to be an impartial arbiter in case of conflict that underpins people’s trust and 
                                                    
2
 For formal treatments of these statements, see, e.g.,  Bohnet, Frey and Huch (2001) with respect to contract 
rights, and Grossman and Kim (1995) with respect to property rights. 
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reciprocity. Like a fire department, impartial government institutions are desired by everyone, 
although everyone wishes that they would never had to be used. 
 
Needless to say, this “behavioral” theory of property and contract rights also incorporates the 
second empirical regularity mentioned above: that trust is positively related to growth. Knack 
and Keefer’s (1997, 1252-3) summary of the ways in which this may happen is very akin to 
our argument: 
Individuals in higher-trust societies spend less to protect themselves from being exploited in economic 
transactions. Written contracts are less likely to be needed, and they do not have to specify every possible 
contingency. Litigation may be less frequent. Individuals in high-trust societies are also likely to divert 
fewer resources to protecting themselves … from unlawful (criminal) violations of their property rights. 
Low trust can also discourage innovation…Societies characterized by high levels of trust are also less 
dependent on formal institutions to enforce agreements…Trusting societies not only have stronger 
incentives to innovate and to accumulate physical capital, but are also likely to have higher returns to 
accumulation of human capital. 
Given that corruption negatively impacts on social trust, thirdly, Mauro’s (1995) finding that 
corruption hurts growth primarily by curbing investment should come as no surprise. Groups 
of people whose common knowledge is that “people like us” are most likely to be 
discriminated against or dealt with in an arbitrary manner by government agents, are not 
likely to make long term investments in productive projects, be it their own education or some 
small scale business project. 
 
Fourth and finally, we interpret Rauch and Evans’s (2000) “Weberian” state hypothesis as 
very much compatible with the impartiality theory. Rauch and Evans (2000) were able to 
gather unprecedented data on the extent to which bureaucracies in 35 developing countries 
employ meritocratic recruitment (as opposed to recruitment reflecting partisan or patrimonial 
spoils), and the extent to which they supply civil servants with competitive salaries and long-
term career paths through internal promotion. These organizational properties turn out to be 
strongly related to the subjective ratings of corruption and bureaucratic efficiency employed 
by Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995). In addition, they turn out to be significantly 
related to economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999). 
 
In sum, this reading of the burgeoning literature on the  determinants of economic growth 
suggests the following expectation: 
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H3: Countries with impartial government institutions sustain higher levels of economic 
growth. 
 
In light of H1, may also follow the following joint prediction: 
 
H3j: Impartial government institutions are linked to higher levels of economic growth 
through their relationship with interpersonal trust. 
Bureaucratic Quality and Civil War 
Illustrating the sometimes devastating consequences of having partial government institutions, 
there are studies showing that the violence that led to the civil war in former Yugoslavia 
broke out after the decision by the President in the newly formed Croatian republic to fire all 
policemen in Croatia of Serbian origin, along with the wholesale dismissal of Serbian 
teachers, doctors, and local officials. For the Serbs living in the new Croatia, also those living 
in the Serb dominated enclave known as Krajina, these were unmistakable signals that they 
and their children could count on a future of widespread discrimination in all dealings with 
authorities, schools, hospitals, etc. There are certainly numerous explanations for the outbreak 
of civil war in former Yugoslavia, but a close examination of the sequential logic shows that 
violence broke out after it was clear to the Serbs living in Croatia that impartiality was no 
longer on the agenda (Rothstein 2009, 11-13). 
 
According to research on the determinants of civil war, the outbreak of the civil war in former 
Yugoslavia might not have been an exception. Fearon and Laitin (2003) in a widely cited 
article show that the outbreak of civil war, contrary to conventional wisdom, is not fostered 
by ethnic or religious diversity. Instead, the primary cause appears to be the central 
government’s police and military incapacity. “Insurgents are better able to survive and 
prosper if the government and military they oppose are relatively weak—badly financed, 
organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on at 
the local level” (ibid., 180). Even more relevant to my theoretical argument, Öberg and 
Melander (2005) find that the onset of civil war is negatively related to the quality of the 
bureaucracy. The theoretical rationale behind this finding would be that conflicts only 
escalate to war in the presence of asymmetric information with respect to the conflicting 
parties. Civil war could always be avoided if a distribution is found that both sides prefer to 
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war, which in its turn requires good and credible information. The authors conclude: “A 
strong, efficient, professional, impartial and meritocratic bureaucracy, that also has some 
measure of autonomy/integrity, will be better at providing the necessary information” (ibid., 
9). 
 
I thus posit the following prediction: 
 
H4: Countries with impartial government institutions sustain lower levels of civil war. 
 
According to the theory this effect is mostly explained by an impartial state bureaucracy’s 
ability to provide credible information that allows conflicting parties to reach negotiated 
agreements short of war. Incidentally, impartial bureaucracies also help promoting growth by 
providing reliable information, for example about possible business partners (Evans and 
Rauch 1999). This is thus also another reason to posit a relationship between impartiality and 
growth. 
Happiness and Predictability 
One of the more remarkable effects of QoG evidenced in the literature is the finding that it 
promotes individual feelings of subjective well-being and happiness – even when personal 
income, health and other plausible determinants of happiness are being controlled for 
(Helliwell 2003; Tavits 2007). In the most recent update of these findings, Helliwell and 
Huang (2008) show that different aspects of the QoG compound matter for different 
countries. In less developed countries, it is QoG on the output side of the political system 
(such as effectiveness and corruption) that matters for well-being, whereas in rich 
industrialized countries, where the output side arguably works better, it is democracy on the 
input side of the system that matters. This finding is in line with Frey and Stutzer (2000), who 
find that more opportunities for democratic participation explain varying levels of happiness 
across Swiss cantons — that is, definitely in a high-development context. Given that “rich, 
industrialized countries” are only a small minority of the worlds’ economies, however, this 
line of research more generally suggests that quality of government matters more than 
democracy for ordinary people’s feelings of happiness. 
 
I thus posit the following prediction: 
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H5: Countries with impartial government institutions have higher levels of subjective well-
being. 
 
But what could explain the impact of impartiality on subjective well-being and happiness? 
Two alternatives suggest themselves. The first is related to the previous discussion of 
hypotheses H1-H4: that impartial government institutions make people happier by increasing 
their stock of social capital, their material welfare (through economic growth) and by 
avoiding deadly civil strife. This joint expectation may be stated more formally: 
 
H5j: Impartial government institutions are linked to higher levels of subjective well-being 
through their relationship with interpersonal trust, economic growth and civil war. 
 
Second, I would argue that another plausible mechanism in this case runs through government 
predictability. A government whose actions are predictable is from a citizen perspective of 
high quality because different life plans can be made with more accuracy and lower risk. To 
me this appears to be one of the less tangible but still fundamental differences between the 
developed and developing world. In the former to a much larger extent that in the latter, the 
state to a high degree operates as a “public risk manager” (Root 2006, ch. 10), that is, 
alleviates physical, economic and social insecurity by making life more predictable. Besides 
helping to increase subjective well-being, predictability may also be another mechanism 
explaining why impartiality is good for growth. Impartiality makes it possible for agents 
outside the state to make predictions of its actions, and making predictions are at the heart of 
the rationale in any economic calculus, be it investing in a business or in an education (Evans 
and Rauch 1999). 
Measuring Impartiality 
How can we go about measuring the impartiality of government institutions? Unfortunately, 
none of the empirical measures among the widely used “worldwide governance indicators” 
(Kaufman et al. 2008) contains direct questions on impartiality. Addressing this omission is 
however one of the primary aims of the so-called “Quality of Government Institute Quality of 
Government Survey”, a recently finished country-expert survey answered by 529 public 
administration experts worldwide (Teorell et al. 2008). The average respondent in this sample 
is a male (66 %), 47-year-old PhD (82 %), and an overwhelming majority of respondents 
were either born (90 %) or live (92 %) in the country for which they have provided their 
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responses. Despite receiving responses by experts on 58 countries, to enhance data quality 
this paper exclusively relies on the 52 countries for which at least 3 expert responses have 
been obtained (see Appendix for more details on these data). Western Europe and Northern 
America together with post-communist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union carry the 
weight of countries covered. Only seven non-Western and non-post-communist countries are 
covered by at least three respondents: India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, and Turkey, the last four of which are OECD members. By and large, then, our 
sample of countries is heavily geared towards the developed world. 
 
Three measurement strategies were used to gauge the theoretical construct of impartiality. 
The first is very direct, asking the respondents to rate their country in terms of the theoretical 
definition of impartiality developed by Rothstein and Teorell (2008):  
 
Q4. By a common definition, impartiality implies that when implementing policies, public 
sector employees should not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not 
stipulated in the policy. Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector 
employees today, in your chosen country, act impartially when deciding how to implement a 
policy in an individual case? 
 
Responses could be given on a response scale ranging from 1, “Hardly ever” to 7, “Almost 
always”. The cross-country mean is 4.65, ranging from a 2.50 in South Africa to 6.44 in 
Australia (the cross-country standard deviation is .99). In this sample of countries, 
government institutions are thus perceived to be impartial more often than not, but the 
variation across countries in this perception is substantial. 
 
The second measurement strategy approaches impartiality by way of a scenario, the case of a 
cash transfer program to the “needy poor”: 
 
Q6. Hypothetically, let’s say that a typical public employee was given the task to distribute an 
amount equivalent to 1000 USD per capita to the needy poor in your country. According to 
your judgment,  please state the percentage that would reach: 
 
The question is then followed by six predetermined response categories for which the 
respondent could fill in a number from 0 to 100 (provided that they sum to 100 percent 
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together). The percentage reaching the “needy poor” is supposed to be a gauge of how 
impartial this particular policy would be implemented. The mean of this percentage is actually 
no larger than 56 percent, although this again conceals quite substantial cross-country 
variation, ranging from a low of 22 percent in Ukraine to a high of 92 percent in Norway (the 
cross-country standard deviation being 21 percent). The remaining (average) 44 percent of the 
cash transfer end up fairly evenly distributed across the remaining response categories: with 
people with kinship ties to the public employee (11 %), middlemen/consultants (13 %), 
superiors of the public employee (7 %), or in the public employee’s own pocket (9 %), the 
remainder (4 %) reaching a residual category of “others”. 
 
The third measurement strategy, finally, is to provide examples of government behavior that 
clearly breach the impartiality principle. Three such examples are provided: 
 
Q2. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the 
following occurs today?  
g. Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public 
procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid? 
h. When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat 
some groups in society unfairly? 
j. When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants 
with which they have strong personal contacts? 
 
Response categories again ranged from 1, “Hardly ever” to 7, “Almost always”. These three 
variables all have fairly balanced cross-country means (at 3.52, 3.54, and 3.65), but again 
display substantial variation across countries (with standard deviations at 1.37, 1.06 and 1.32, 
respectively). 
 
With all five measures of impartiality correlating strongly across countries (at .75 to .84), and 
clearly loading on one single factor in a principle components factor analysis, I will in this 
paper be employing one single impartiality index constructed by adding each measure 
weighted by their respective factor loading. This factor index thus by construction has a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The point estimates for each country are shown in Figure 1, 
together with bootstrap estimates of the 95 percent confidence intervals by country.3 
                                                    
3
 Since the average sample size per country is less than 10 respondents, non-parametric bootstrapped confidence 
intervals are deemed more accurate than parametric ones based on the normality assumption. The bootstrap 
estimates have been performed on the 519 respondents whom have provided a response for any of the five items 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As can be seen, the impartiality index varies widely across countries. The countries perceived 
as having the least impartial public administrations are South Africa, Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whereas the most impartial ones are located in Denmark, 
Switzerland, Austria, Norway and New Zealand. As the confidence intervals indicate, these 
point estimates are of course noisy. Some countries are causes of particular concern, such as 
Malta and Latvia, having comparatively large standard errors due to a combination of small 
sample sizes and considerable disagreement among experts. The mean 95 percent confidence 
interval is however only .77, and the ratio of the between- over the within-country variance 
around 1.2. Moreover, it is not simply the case that these confidence intervals are decreasing 
in the level of impartiality. The correlation between the mean and the confidence interval 
across countries is a meager –.20. On the whole, I would thus deem these point estimates 
precise enough to allow meaningful country comparisons. 
 
Exploring the Empirical Predictions 
I now turn to the test of the empirical predictions developed above. It should be made 
immediately clear that these tests are by no means conclusive. With only 52 observations 
from a cross-section of countries, and a great degree of collinearity to be expected among 
both outcome and potential control variables, the possibilities to fully deal with specification 
error and endogeneity bias are limited. It should also be noted that whereas several 
predictions from my theory concern individual-level phenomena (H1, H2 and H5), I will here 
only test these prediction on the aggregate level. The measurement noise introduced into the 
impartiality index is another potential source of estimation bias that has not been dealt with. 
The results should be interpreted accordingly: as suggestive and tentative. 
 
These reservations notwithstanding, I will employ a two-pronged testing strategy. First, I will 
compare simple cross-country correlations between the outcome variables and the impartiality 
index on the one hand and a selection of benchmark measures of quality of government drawn 
                                                                                                                                                                 
comprising the impartiality index. Bias-corrected 95 percent confidence intervals with 1000 replications on a 
country-by-country basis have been estimated in Stata 10.0. 
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from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) on the other. More specifically, I will 
make systematic comparisons with the government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of 
corruption indicators (see Kaufmann et al. 2008). There are several reasons underlying this 
choice. First of all, the WGI are the most widely used measures of QoG in comparative 
political economy. To be taken seriously in the future, the impartiality index must thus be able 
to stand up against these broadly approved alternatives. Moreover, the three WGI benchmark 
indicators tap into slightly different dimensions of QoG, none of which correspond perfectly 
to the theory of impartiality outlined above (see Rothstein and Teorell 2008). The government 
effectiveness indicator, for one, clearly concerns the public administration, but more in terms 
of its capacity to get things done irrespective of how things are done procedurally. Control of 
corruption in many respects is a necessary requirement for impartial policy implementation, 
but certainly not a sufficient one, since impartiality also precludes other dysfunctional 
government “ills” such as clientelism, nepotism or systematic discrimination. Rule of law, 
finally, is certainly similar to impartiality if interpreted as equality before the law, but 
impartiality again is a wider concept including spheres of state action other than the ones 
directly governed by law. In sum, the notion of impartiality must also at the level of 
measurement be able to compete with these narrower interpretations of QoG in terms of 
explaining various societal outcomes.  
 
The second part of my testing strategy will be to compare partial correlations between 
outcome variables and the alternative measures of QoG, holding a highly parsimonious model 
of controls variables constant.4 There is of course a general concern that simple correlations 
could simply tap into spurious dependencies between QoG and outcome variables that in fact 
are generated by common underlying causes. A first obvious contender to be considered is 
national income. The risk of introducing variables such as GDP per capita however is that it 
could  be controlling for too much, since one of the empirical predictions (H3) is that more 
impartial countries sustain higher levels of economic growth. My suggested solution to this is 
to include GDP per capita but measured at a considerably earlier time point. More 
specifically, I will be controlling for the first year of measurement per country in the 1971-
2007 series of data on Real GDP per Capita produced by the United Nations Statistics 
                                                    
4
 The reason I employ partial correlation rather than multiple regression is simply that it facilitates comparisons 
across measures of QoG. What I in effect compare is thus a measure of fit rather than effect magnitude, since the 
correlation coefficient is a simply the square root of explained variance (in the multivariate case for the 
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Division (2008). This will increase the chances that the part of QoG produced by economic 
development is partialled out without at the same time eliminating the effect running in the 
opposite direction. I will also throughout be controlling for two usual suspects in comparative 
political economy, namely level of education (measured as gross tertiary enrolment from 
UNESCO 2007) and ethnolinguistic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003). Descriptive 
information for all variables used, and their original sources, are for the estimation sample of 
52 countries provided in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The first empirical prediction, that countries with more impartial government institutions also 
have populations more likely to trust one another (H1), is tested in Table 2. The measure of 
interpersonal trust employed is the traditional item asking whether “most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people” in the European/World 
Values Surveys from around 1995-2004. As can be seen, this measure of social capital 
correlates fairly strongly (at .68) with the level of impartiality, under all circumstances more 
strongly than with any of the three WGI indicators. The unconditional relationship is 
portrayed in Figure 2. Whereas this would seem to lend support to H1, this pattern is however 
not upheld once the three control variables are held constant. With controls, the partial 
correlation between impartiality and social trust drops to .18, far below conventional levels of 
statistical significance (although the benchmark WGI measures fare even worse). More 
detailed analyses do not provide a clear answer as to why this is the case. With only GDP per 
capita among the control variables, the correlation is still moderate (.30) and significant. Once 
education and fractionalization is added, however, the partial correlation drops to 
insignificance despite the fact that neither of these additional controls by themselves exert any 
significance influence on interpersonal trust. This suggest that multicollinearity could be the 
culprit. In sum, H1 is only weakly supported by the data. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between the residuals of the two variables after taking the controls into account). In terms of 
statistical significance, all results are exactly equivalent if tested with multiple regression instead.  
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H2 is more robustly supported, in particular for trust in the police.5 As Figure 3 indicates, 
impartial government institutions and trust in the police are well correlated (at .47) even after 
controls. The same goes for trust in the civil service, although the correlation in this case is 
more moderate. The relationship with trust in the justice system, however, is only marginally 
significant, perhaps reflecting the fact that the courts are not considered by ordinary citizens 
to be as clearly a part of the public administration. In any case, only in one instance do the 
correlations with the WGI outperform those with impartiality: trust in the police is even more 
strongly correlated with control of corruption. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Are people more trusting of one another in more impartial countries because they put more 
confidence in government bodies responsible for law enforcement and policy 
implementation? As the lower-end panel of Table 2 makes clear, only modestly so and almost 
exclusively due to trust in the police. There is thus at best weak support for H2j, a pattern that 
perhaps should not come as a surprise given that the relationship between impartiality and 
interpersonal trust is not as robust as expected. 
 
Turning to Table 3, there at first seems to be no relationship between impartiality – or any 
other QoG indicator for that matter – and the average growth record for the last almost four 
decades (GDP per capita again provided by UNSD 2008). This however only reflects the fact 
that at least this sample of countries display a fair amount of convergence in the national 
income levels over time. That is, the richer countries have over the time period from 1971 and 
onwards been growing slower than the poorer ones. Once this negative relationship with 
initial income levels have been cancelled out, impartiality is significantly related to growth, 
even after taking education and social heterogeneity into account. Figure 4 portrays the 
conditional relationship, which corresponds to a partial correlation coefficient of .40. This 
correlation is clearly stronger than that with control of corruption (at .33), and certainly on par 
with that with government effectiveness (at .38) and rule of law (at .42). Particularly the fact 
that the WGI rule of law measure, which includes several indicators on the security of 
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property and contract rights that are favored among economists’ explanations for how 
institutions cause growth (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2005), does not perform markedly better 
than the impartiality index in predicting growth is unexpectedly good news for my theory. 
True, endogeneity bias is a serious problem here since the test basically looks at the 
relationship between QoG today and growth yesterday. However, no preferable alternative 
exists given the lack of historical data on impartiality. H3 is thus supported. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
[Figure 4 about hear] 
 
Again, however, the joint prediction (H3j) that impartiality causes growth through its effect 
on interpersonal trust must be rejected. The partial correlation between impartiality (or any of 
the WGI indicators) and growth averages is unaffected by the inclusion of interpersonal trust 
among the controls. There are two explanations for this. To begin with, as already noted,  
impartiality and trust are not significantly related once the other control variables are taken 
into account. However, pace Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), and 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), it is also the case that interpersonal trust is not significantly related 
to growth in this data. 
 
The predictions for civil war in Table 4 are tested in a manner similar to that of growth. Since 
the incidence of domestic armed conflict fluctuates over time in any given country, I have 
used the over-time averages (this time throughout the entire post-WWII period) as indicators 
of the propensity for armed conflict. Drawing on data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), two thresholds for the number of battle-related deaths 
restricted to the country’s own territory have been established: above 1000, indicating full-
scale “civil war”, and above 20 but below 1000, signifying “civil conflict”. It appears that 
only the former, more serious, expression of domestic warfare is significantly related to 
impartiality once initial levels of income, level of education and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization are being held constant. And even then the partial correlation is a meager  
–.28, only passing the 90 percent threshold for statistical significance. As Figure 5 makes 
                                                                                                                                                                 
5
 The three measures of institutional trust are all drawn from a battery of EVS/WVS items asking “how much 
confidence” the respondent as in a series of organizations: “a great deal” (1), “quite a  lot“ (2) , “not very much” 
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clear, this weak correlation moreover only hinges on one single observation: Russia, and its 
long-lasting war in Chechnya. Without Russia in the sample, no significant partial correlation 
remains between impartiality and the propensity for civil war, a pattern that emerges also for 
the WGI measures, two of which (control of corruption and rule of law) show correlations 
with civil war on par with the impartiality index. By and large, then, H4 is only modestly 
supported. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Figure 5 about hear] 
 
Turning to Table 5, finally, the final two predictions (H5 and H5j) are well in line with the 
observed relationships for two measures of subjective well-being: the ordinary “life 
satisfaction” item from the European/World Values Surveys,6 and Veenhoven’s (2007) 
measure of “years lived happy”, based on subjective well-being questions multiplied by life 
expectancy.7 As can be seen, these outcome variables are well correlated with impartiality 
even after controls are included. Moreover, the relationship is, by and large, due to the posited 
causal mechanism through interpersonal trust, economic growth, and the experience of civil 
war. As the bottom-end panel shows, impartiality is no longer significantly related to life 
satisfaction once these other outcome variables have been controlled for, and with years lived 
happy more weakly so. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
This time, however, the WGI indicators clearly outperform the impartiality index in terms of 
the magnitude of the correlations. Whereas the impartiality index correlate with the two 
subjective well-being measures in the order of .37-.41, the WGI correlations are significantly 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(3), or “none at all” (1). These scales have been reversed so that higher numbers indicate more trust. 
6
 The question wording is: ”All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”, 
with responses varying from (1) “Dissatisfied” to (10) “Satisfied”. 
7
 More specifically, I have employed Veenhoven’s (2007) mixed measure from 1995-2005: Life-
expectancy at birth multiplied by average survey self-assessments of subjective life satisfaction 
(combined measure of 10-step life satisfaction and 11-step best-worst life), where the latter is scaled to 
range from 0-1. 
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stronger (at .61-.71). Exactly what produces this pattern in not evidently clear. A graphical 
comparison for the life satisfaction indicator is  displayed in Figures 6a and 6b.  
 
[Figure 6a about hear] 
[Figure 6b about hear] 
Conclusions 
In sum, I have found clear support for three out five main expectations: that impartial 
government institutions enhance institutional trust (H2), sustain higher levels of economic 
growth (H3), and make people more happy (H5). The joint hypothesis that impartiality makes 
people more happy because they increase interpersonal trust and economic growth, and 
reduce the propensity for civil war (H5j), is also confirmed. The propositions that impartiality 
also enhances interpersonal trust (H1) and reduces the risk of civil war (H4) are however only 
supported absent of controls. The fact that the relationship with interpersonal trust drops to 
insignificance after controls could however be due to multicollinearity, and the civil war 
prediction is marginally significant if we accept the influence of one extreme outlier: Russia. 
Given the broad scope of these predictions, including both attitudinal, economic and social 
phenomena, I believe these tentative tests overall lend unexpectedly strong support to the 
impartiality theory. 
 
Moreover, only in the case of subjective well-being did the benchmark measures from WGI 
systematically outperform the impartiality index in terms of predictive fit (the other partial 
exception is the correlation between control of corruption and trust in the police). A low-cost 
web survey with public administration scholars, the results of which we hope soon to make 
publicly available, thus produced a gauge of quality of government that could well compete 
with the hoards of data sources and sophisticated estimation techniques employed by the 
World Bank Institute. Although this of course involves a comparison of not only the  
measurement strategy but also the underlying theory, it is encouraging news for our survey 
experiment, which we hope to extend to other parts of the world in the future. 
 
The empirical predictions that worked less well were the joint hypothesis stating that 
impartiality should affect interpersonal trust through its effect on institutional trust (H2j), and 
that it should affect growth through its effect on interpersonal trust (H3j). Of these two, the 
first is the least troublesome for the theory. If people infer from their experience with 
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government institutions that other people cannot be trusted, as suggested by Rothstein (2005) 
and Rothstein and Stolle (2009), that inference need not necessarily pass through a judgement 
over the trustworthiness of the government institutions themselves. (Besides, it could also be 
the case that this particular prediction does hold water at the individual-level.) Of greater 
concern is however the failure of the growth-enhancing social capital mechanism to 
materialize. If impartial government institutions affect growth but not by enhancing the stock 
of social capital, as my results would suggest, through what mechanisms does this effect 
occur? As suggested by Evans and Rauch (1999), credible information and predictability 
could be two alternative theoretical mechanisms, but further theoretical and empirical work is 
needed to address this important question. 
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Appendix: Country and Expert Selection in the “Quality of Government Institute 
Quality of Government Survey” 
 
After an open pilot survey available on our website in the Winter of 2007-2008, the main study has 
been conducted between September 2008 and May 2009 as a web survey of public administration 
experts in a wide array of countries. Although the scope of the survey is global in principle, we soon 
realized that there would be a trade-off between the number of countries we could include in the study, 
particularly from the developing world, and the information we could acquire on potential public 
administration experts to select for the sample. The solution to this problem that we opted for was to 
select experts first, and then let the experts, by themselves choosing the country for which they wanted 
to provide their responses, determine the selection of countries. In practice, what we did was to 
assemble a list of persons registered with four international networks for public administration 
scholars: The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern 
Europe (NISPACEE), The European Group of Public Administration Scholars (EGPA), the European 
Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), and the Structure and Organization of Government (SOG) 
Research Committee at IPSA. The homepages of these scholarly networks provided the bulk of names 
of public administration scholars that was sent the questionnaire, but we also did some complementary 
searches on the internet, drew from personal contacts of scholars at the QoG Institute, and used the list 
of experts recruited from the pilot survey.  
All in all, this resulted in a sample of 1288 persons. We contacted these persons by email, 
including some background information on the survey, a request to take part, together with a clickable 
link inside the email leading to the web-based questionnaire in English. The only incentives presented 
to participants were access to the data, a first-hand report, and the possibility of being invited to future 
conferences on the Quality of Government. 
After three reminders, 499 or 38.7 percent of these experts had responded, providing responses 
for 54 countries. In order to cover some underrepresented small European states, and to enhance the 
coverage of countries with critically low response rates, we launched a second wave of the survey 
beginning in January this year. This fresh sample was based on extended internet searches and 
  28 
personal contacts, with the addition of a snowballing component through which one responding expert 
could suggest other experts on his or her country. On May 25, 30 additional valid responses (41.1 %) 
out of 73 sampled experts had been collected, covering 9 countries (4 of which were not covered in the 
original sample). 
On the whole, this leaves us with 529 expert responses on 58 countries (see table below). The 
average respondent in this sample is a male (66 %), 47-year-old PhD (82 %). An overwhelming 
majority of respondents were either born (90 %) or live (92 %) in the country for which they have 
provided their responses. To enhance data quality, I have in this paper exclusively relied on the 52 
countries for which at least 3 expert responses have been obtained. While the number of respondents 
even among this restricted set of countries varies substantially, from only 3 for Brazil and Uzbekistan 
to a maximum of 28 in the Czech Republic, on average 10 experts per country have taken the time to 
respond to our survey. As should be expected from the sampling frame, Western Europe and Northern 
America together with post-communist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union carry the weight 
of countries covered. 
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Number of Valid Responses by Country 
Country Respondents Country Respondents 
Albania 11 South Korea 7 
Armenia 16 Kyrgyzstan 6 
Australia 10 Latvia 7 
Austria 5 Lithuania 11 
Azerbaijan 6 Luxembourg 1 
Belarus 9 Macedonia 7 
Belgium 7 Malta 4 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 7 Mauritius 1 
Brazil 3 Mexico 11 
Bulgaria 22 Netherlands 14 
Canada 13 New Zealand 12 
China 1 Nigeria 2 
Croatia 6 Norway 12 
Cyprus 2 Poland 11 
Czech Republic 28 Portugal 9 
Denmark 13 Romania 17 
Estonia 10 Russian Federation 6 
Finland 11 Serbia & Montenegro 2 
France 6 Slovakia 7 
Georgia 8 Slovenia 11 
Germany 12 South Africa 4 
Greece 22 Spain 7 
Hungary 15 Sweden 11 
Iceland 4 Switzerland 5 
India 7 Turkey 5 
Ireland 16 Ukraine 11 
Italy 7 United Kingdom 11 
Japan 9 United States 19 
Kazakhstan 7 Uzbekistan 3 
  TOTAL 529 
Note: Countries in italics are not included in this paper due to too low response rate. 
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Figure 1. The impartiality index 
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Figure 2. Impartiality and Interpersonal Trust (unconditional) 
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Figure 3. Impartiality and Trust in the Police (conditional) 
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Figure 4. Impartiality and Economic Growth (conditional) 
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Figure 5. Impartiality and Civil War (conditional) 
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Figure 6a. Impartiality and Life Satisfaction (conditional) 
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Figure 6b. Government Effectiveness and Life Satisfaction (conditional) 
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Table 1. Descriptive information 
Variable (source) Mean Std Min Max n 
      Impartiality index  0 1 –1.63 1.76 52 
Government Effectiveness (Kaufman et al. 2008) .77 1.06 –1.10 2.22 52 
Control of corruption (Kaufman et al. 2008) .62 1.17 –1.08 2.46 52 
Rule of Law (Kaufman et al. 2008) .57 1.07 –1.41 1.94 52 
Interpersonal trust (EVS/WVS 2006) .30 .15 .03 .67 50 
Trust in the police (EVS/WVS 2006) 2.56 .35 1.87 3.19 50 
Trust in civil service (EVS/WVS 2006) 2.31 .21 1.78 2.70 50 
Trust in justice system (EVS/WVS 2006) 2.43 .26 1.93 2.96 48 
Growth 1971-2007 (UNSD 2008) 2.41 1.56 –1.36 8.92 52 
Civil Conflict 1946-2004 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) .07 .14 0 .71 52 
Civil War 1946-2004 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) .03 .08 0 .46 52 
Life satisfaction (EVS/WVS 2006) 6.59 1.21 4.32 8.24 49 
Years lived happy (Veenhofen 2007) 46.1 11.8 24.8 63.9 51 
GDP per capita at starting year (UNSD 2008) 6815 6377 251 27348 52 
Gross Tertiary Education Enrollment  
(UNESCO 2007) 
 
49.05 
 
20.30 
 
10.97 
 
85.00 
 
50 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  
(Alesina et al. 2003) 
 
.30 
 
.21 
 
.00 
 
.75 
 
52 
 
Note: Data for the impartiality index has been collected through the QoG Institute QoG Survey (Teorell et al. 
2008). All other variables are from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al. 2009), except the trust 
variables and the UNESCO data on enrollment, which are from the QoG Social Policy Dataset (Samanni et al. 
2008). 
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Table 2. Interpersonal and institutional trust 
 Impartiality Effectiveness Corruption Rule of Law n 
      Without controls:      
   Interpersonal trust .68*** .60*** .66*** .60*** 50 
 
     
   Trust in the police .72*** .69*** .77*** .72*** 50 
   Trust in justice system .41*** .28* .38*** .34** 48 
   Trust in civil service .46*** .42*** .41*** .41*** 50 
 
     With controls:      
   Interpersonal trust .18 –.08 .04 –.07 48 
 
     
   Trust in the police .47*** .45*** .58*** .47*** 48 
   Trust in justice system .27* .05 .15 .10 46 
   Trust in civil service .39*** .33** .34** .33** 48 
 
     Interpersonal trust when 
controlling for: 
     
   Trust in the police .49*** .37*** .45*** .36** 50 
   Trust in justice system .60*** .55*** .58*** .52*** 48 
   Trust in civil service .67*** .58*** .64*** .57*** 50 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients (bivariate or partial). Control variables are GDP per capita at starting 
year, gross tertiary education enrollment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
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Table 3. Economic growth 
 Impartiality Effectiveness Corruption Rule of Law n 
      Without controls:      
   Growth 1971-2007 .06 –.02 .01 .07 52 
 
     With controls:      
   Growth 1971-2007 .40*** .38*** .33** .42*** 50 
 
     With controls, including 
interpersonal trust: 
     
   Growth 1971-2007 .44*** .41*** .35** .54*** 48 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients (bivariate or partial). Control variables are GDP per capita at starting 
year, gross tertiary education enrollment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
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Table 4. Civil war 
 Impartiality Effectiveness Corruption Rule of Law n 
      Without controls:      
   Civil War 1946-2004 –.35** –.33** –.35** –.34** 52 
   Civil Conflict 1946-2004 –.29** –.30** –.31** –.31** 52 
 
     With controls:      
   Civil War 1946-2004 –.28* –.22 –.31** –.27* 50 
   Civil Conflict 1946-2004 .06 .05 .08 .09 50 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients (bivariate or partial). Control variables are GDP per capita at starting 
year, gross tertiary education enrollment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
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Table 5. Subjective well-being 
 Impartiality Effectiveness Corruption Rule of Law n 
      Without controls:      
   Life satisfaction .72*** .84*** .86*** .84*** 49 
   Years lived happy .79*** .85*** .88*** .86*** 51 
 
     With controls:      
   Life satisfaction .37** .69*** .71*** .68*** 47 
   Years lived happy .41*** .61** .64*** .63*** 49 
 
     With controls, including 
interpersonal trust, 
growth & civil war: 
     
   Life satisfaction .25 .63*** .66*** .61*** 47 
   Years lived happy .33** .59*** .60*** .62*** 50 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients (bivariate or partial). Control variables are GDP per capita at starting 
year, gross tertiary education enrollment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
 
 
 
 
